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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

13 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Some Consequences of Renewed Kurdish Hostilities

1. The first conclusion of SNIE 30-3-63: "Some Implications of a Renewal of Kurdish Hostilities" (15 May 1963) read:

"If serious negotiations between the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi Government fail to get under way soon, renewed fighting is likely. However, the Iraqi armed forces would probably not be much more effective against the Kurds today than they were under Kassim. Such fighting could seriously threaten the floundering Baathist regime. The Soviets have given open endorsement to the Iraqi Kurds; they probably intend to agitate the issue and at least to lend political support to the rebellious Kurds. We do not believe the Soviets would get heavily committed to providing material help in any quantity unless there were also a Kurdish revolt in Iran which moved the entire conflict up to the USSR's borders."

2. Since the completion of this estimate serious negotiations between the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi government did not get underway and the fighting broke out anew. We regard the situation as very serious. The Baathist regime has expressed its determination to use all available means to bring the Kurds

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

to heel. It has some 45,000 men -- nearly two-thirds of its armed forces -- in the north and intends to employ a "scorched earth" policy of destroying crops, villages and flocks wherever it can reach them. With the forces available, the army probably will make some progress initially, but we believe it will remain largely road-bound and relatively ineffective against the Kurdish guerrilla tactics and that a prolonged stalemate will ensue. Operations against the civilian population will produce deep and lasting bitterness between Kurd and Arab.

3. The second conclusion read:

"The Iraqi Kurds are likely to avoid antagonizing Iran, at least until they gain their objectives in Iraq. Their desire to retain Iranian benevolence, the lack of respected Kurdish leaders in Iran, and the capabilities of the Iranian military seem likely to prevent serious trouble in Iran."

4. We continue to believe the Iraqi fighting will not spark trouble among the Iranian Kurds. Even if trouble did break out, the Iranian military and security services should be able to contain it. The recent rioting in Teheran did not spread to rural areas and there has been no diminution of military strength in Kurdistan. Further, the government appears to be making progress in damping down the tribal disturbances

- 2 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

in Fars Province, a development which will increase the
Shah's capability vis-a-vis the Kurds.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



[Signature] SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

25X1

- 3 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Memorandum

TO : DCI
VIA : DD/I

FROM : AD/NE

DATE: 13 June 1963

SUBJECT: Memorandum: "Some Consequences of Renewed Kurdish Hostilities"

This memo is a reaffirmation of SNIE 30-3-63, "Some Implications of a Renewal of Kurdish Hostilities," 15 May 1963, now that fighting has actually broken out on a large scale. No substantive disagreements were encountered when it was discussed in draft with interested components of the DD/I and the DD/P.

CONCURRENCE:

Deputy Director/Intelligence

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